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NOTES AND COMMENTS
males may find themselves prosecuted for crimes heretofore unknown.33
On the other hand, there is strong argument in favor of its use. The
individual right of citizens to be free from fear and apprehension of
injury by such offensive and threatening conduct as displayed in the
principal case deserves the protection of the state. Through the use
of such a rule, a gap in the criminal law has effectively been closed.
A definitive statute might bring more certainty to a field of the law
where certainty is of the utmost importance.
FREDERICK C. MEEKINS
Domestic Relations-Procedure-Abatement of Actions by
Pendency of Prior Actions
The question as to whether a pending action in the alimony-divorce
area will abate a subsequent independent action in the same area with
the parties reversed has again been passed on by the North Carolina
Supreme Court in the case of Beeson v. Beeson.'
The court initially held in Cook v. Cook2 that where the husband
commenced proceedings for absolute divorce and the wife thereafter
sued for divorce from bed and board in separate proceedings and during
pendency of the husband's prior suit, the former action did not abate
the latter. This decision seems to indicate that although a divorce action,
either absolute or from bed and board, may be brought as a counterclaim,
such is not mandatory. Later, however, the court in Cameron v.
Cameron3 held that whether the first action abated the second depended
upon certain well established tests.
The facts in the Cameron case were substantially as follows: The
wife sued for divorce from bed and board alleging abandonment. While
this suit was pending, the husband instituted an independent action in
a different county for absolute divorce on the grounds of two years
separation.4 The wife pleaded the pendency of her action in abatement
of the husband's subsequent suit. Her plea was sustained by the
Supreme Court. After stating the general rule to be that a subsequent
action is not abatable on the ground that the plaintiff therein might ob-
tain the same relief by a counterclaim or cross demand in a prior suit
pending against him, the court pointed out that this general rule is not
applicable where the cause of action asserted by the plaintiff in the seccind
action is essentially a part of the first action and will necessarily be
"A Survey of the Decisions of the North Carolina Supreme Court for the
Spring and Fall terms of 1953, 32 N.C.L. Ray. 379, 425 (1954). Cf. Notes, 13
U. DET. L.J. 227 (1950), 11 RocKY MT. L. Rzv. 104 (1939).
-246 N.C. 330, 98 S.E.2d 17 (1957).
'159 N.C. 47, 74 S.E.2d 639 (1912).
'235 N.C. 82, 68 S.E.2d 796 (1952).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1950).
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adjudicated by the judgment in the first action. In such cases, the
court continued, the law devises a special test of identity of parties
and causes and holds that the pendency of the prior action abates the
subsequent action when, and only when, two conditions concur: "(1)
the plaintiff in the second action can obtain the same relief by a
counterclaim or cross demand in the prior action pending against him;
and (2) a judgment on the merits in favor of the opposing party in the
prior action will operate as a bar to the plaintiff's prosecution of the
subsequent action." 5 The court concluded that since the husband could
counterclaim for divorce in the wife's prior action6 and since if the wife
satisfied her allegation of abandonment the husband's subsequent action
for divorce on grounds of two years separation would necessarily be
barred, 7 the husband's counterclaim must be considered as mandatory.
Although the factual situation in the Cameron case is converse to
that of Cook v. Cook, in that it was the wife who commenced the first
action in the Cameron case, it would certainly seem that if the Cameron
tests were applied to facts similar to those in the Cook case the wife's
counterclaim would likewise be compulsory, for she, too, may counter-
claim in the husband's prior suit,8 and the husband's absolute divorce
decree would necessarily bar all subsequent alimony proceedings. 0 In
fact, the court in the Cameron case so intimated.10
. 5235 N.C. 82, 86, 68 S.E.2d 796, 799 (1952). Accord, Brothers v. Bell
Bakeries, Inc., 231 N.C. 428, 57 S.E.2d 317 (1950) ; Smith-Dwiggins v. Parkway
Bus Co., 230 N.C. 234, 52 S.E.2d 892 (1949) ; Johnson v. Smith, 215 N.C. 322, 1
S.E.2d 834 (1939) ; Brown v. Polk, 201 N.C. 375, 160 S.E. 357 (1931) ; Murchison
Nat'l Bank v. Broadhurst, 197 N.C. 365, 148 S.E. 452 (1929) ; Harris v. Johnson,
65 N.C. 478 (1871). For cases in accord with the Cameroli case, see Hill v. Hill
Spinning Co., 244 N.C. 554, 94 S.E.2d 677 (1956) ; McDowell v. Blythe Bros. Co.,
236 N.C. 396, 72 S.E.2d 860 (1952).
'Lockhart v. Lockhart, 223 N.C. 559, 27 S.E.2d 444 (1943); Ellis v. Ellis,
190 N.C. 418, 130 S.E. 7 (1925). It is now possible for the husband to counter-
claim in the wife's alimony without divorce action under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16
(Supp. 1955).
Pharr v. Pharr, 223 N.C. 115, 25 S.E.2d 471 (1943) ; Byers v. Byers, 223 N.C.
85, 25 S.E.2d 466 (1943) ; Brown v. Brown, 213 N.C. 347, 196 S.E. 333 (1938) ;
Parker v. Parker, 210 N.C. 264, 186 S.E. 346 (1936) ; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208
N.C. 428, 181 S.E. 338 (1935).
' "If any husband shall separate himself from his wife and fail to provide her
and the children of the marriage with the necessary subsistence according to his
means and condition in life, or if he shall be a drunkard or spendthrift, or be guilty
of any misconduct or acts that would be or constitute cause for divorce, either
absolute or from bed and board, the wife may institute an action in the superior
court of the county in which the cause of action arose to have a reasonable sub-
sistence and counsel fees allotted and paid or secured to her from the estate or
earnings of her husband, or she may set up such cause of action as a cross action
in any suit for divorce, either absolute or from bed and board; and the husband
may seek a decree of divorce, either absolute or from bed and board, in any action
brought by his wife under this section . . . " N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16 (Supp.1955).
"After a judgment of divorce from the bonds of matrimony, all rights arising
out of the marriage shall cease and determine, and either party may marry again
unless otherwise provided by law . . . provided further, that except in case of
divorce obtained with personal service on the wife, either within or without the
[Vol. 36
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Nevertheless, the court in Beeson v. Beeson excluded actions for
alimony arising under G.S. § 50-16 subsequent to the husband's divorce
proceedings from compulsory counterclaim treatment. Although
Cameron v. Cameron was extensively argued before the court by both
parties on appeal, 1 the Beeson decision completely omits any mention
thereof. G.S. § 50-16 states: "[T]he wife may institute an action in
superior court... or she may set up such action as a cross action .... -12
The court reasoned that the wife's counterclaim could not be considered
as mandatory since she was given an election by the statute either to sue
independently or to counterclaim in her husband's prior suit. Had the
court desired to hold otherwise it could have drawn strong support from
the case of Reece v. Reece.13
Although this statutory construction seems susceptible to honest
criticism from the standpoint of pleadings and procedure, in that it
prevents application of the Cameron tests, the final result does seem
to be consistent with existing general policy throughout the country
today that the duty of support should continue notwithstanding termina-
tion of the marriage contract, excluding, of course, cases of the wife's
misconduct.1
4
In North Carolina absolute divorce and alimony cannot be obtained
by the wife at the same time.15 An alimony decree will survive an ab-
solute divorce, however, if obtained prior thereto16 unless the divorce is
obtained in an action instituted by the wife on the grounds of two years
separation or is granted to the husband on the grounds of the wife's
adultery.'1  Hence, unless the female spouse obtains her alimony decree
or settlement prior to the final divorce decree her claim for future sup-
State, upon the grounds of the wife's adultery and except in case of divorce ob-
tained by the wife in an action initiated by her on the ground of separation for the
statutory period, a decree of absolute divorce shall not impair or destroy the
right of the wife to receive alimony and other rights provided for her under any
judgment or decree of a court rendered before the rendering of the judgment for
absolute divorce." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11 (Supp. 1955). See Hobbs v. Hobbs,
218 N.C. 468, 11 S.E.2d 311 (1940); Bidwell v. Bidwell, 139 N.C. 402, 52 S.E.
55 (1905).
10235 N.C. 82, 87, 68 S.E.2d 796, 800 (1952).
"Brief for Appellant, pp. 4, 7, Beeson v. Beeson, 246 N.C. 330, 98 S.E.2d 17
(1957) ; Brief for Appellee, id. at pp. 2, 3.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16 (Supp. 1955).
13231 N.C. 321, 56 S.E.2d 641 (1949). The husband sued for absolute divorce
and the wife thereafter sued for alimony without divorce in an independent action
during pendency of the husband's action. The court held that the first action did
not abate the second, for under the court's interpretation of G.S. § 50-16 at that
time the wife could not counterclaim for alimony, but was required to sue
independently. Since the court based its decision on the fact that the alimony
without divorce action had to be brought as an independent action at that time,
the intimation is that the pendency of the prior action would abate the subsequent
alimony without divorce action if the subsequent action could be brought as a
counterclaim. By amendment to G.S. § 50-16, the alimony without divorce action
may now be brought as a cross action. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16 (Supp. 1955).
" See Note, 31 N.C. L. REV. 482 (1953). "5 See note 9 supra.
1 Ibid. 17 Ibid.
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port will be forever barred. Therefore, the wife who has valid grounds
for absolute divorce is forced to bring suit for alimony before suing for
divorce if she desires both. The effect of the Beeson decision, then, is
dearly consistent with general policy for it enhances the wife's chances
of getting an alimony decree before final adjudication of her husband's
divorce action. Nevertheless, it is true that Beeson does violence to
the equally sound principles of avoiding piecemeal litigation and of
preventing a multiplicity of suits which frequently result in conflicting
verdicts based upon substantially the same evidence.' 8
It is unlikely that the Beeson case will undermine Cameron v. Cam-
eron, since the two cases are factually distinguishable. Furthermore the
Beeson decision is based upon a statutory interpretation of G.S. § 50-16.
The decision adds further weight to the contention that North Carolina
should amend its divorce laws in order to permit a wife who has valid
grounds for divorce to obtain her absolute divorce and alimony by either
suing for both in the same action or by means of a counterclaim in any
action instituted by her husband.19
JAmES N. GOLDING
Evidence-Opinion Testimony of Speed
In Fleming v. Twiggs,' the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
a witness's testimony that the defendant's car was traveling seventy
miles per hour when it struck the plaintiff was inadmissible because the
witness had not had sufficient opportunity to form an opinion of probative
value. The witness had heard the sound of brakes and looked back to
see defendant's car just before it struck the deceased. She then turned
her head away so as not to see the accident. The court stated: "When
a witness has had no reasonable opportunity to judge speed of an auto-
mobile, it is error to permit him to testify in regard thereto. ' 2
The above language was quoted from State v. Becker,3 where the
witness testified that she had first seen the car that struck her when it
was fifteen feet away, and that it was going fifty-five miles per hour.
There was other undisputed evidence that the car stopped twenty-five
feet after it hit the witness. The court rejected the estimate of speed,
saying that it would have been a physical impossibility for the defendant
to have stopped his car in so short a distance if at the time in question
it was traveling at such a rate of speed. However, this was a criminal
action, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and not only was
'
8 Emry v. Chappell, 148 N.C. 327, 330, 62 S.E. 411, 412 (1908).
See note 14 supra.
'244 N.C. 666, 94 S.E.2d 821 (1956).
Id. at 669, 94 S.E.2d at 824.
S241 N.C. 321, 327, 85 S.E.2d 327, 331 (1955).
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